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Abstract 
A study of the NESCo provides a micro-history of the emergence of the electricity supply industry in 
Britain up to the First World War. This research examines the role of social capital in the 
establishment and growth of the NESCo, the only financially successful British electric power 
company. Temporal bracketing was adopted to evaluate two distinct time periods: emergence from 
1889-1899; and growth from 1900-1914. Family, business and social networks together with 
geographical and political factors secured the company’s dominant position. The structural 
relationship with Merz & McLellan contributed to growth through acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
access to new markets. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of the emergence of new industries has been ‘relatively neglected’ by researchers.1 The 
emergence stage in the life cycle model is the time period following the commercialisation of the 
product and immediately before the growth stage. 2  One reason for the dearth of research is a lack 
of cogent theories of entrepreneurship at the micro-level.3  This means that emerging industries are 
not easy to study and are often not identified until after they have matured.4 Forbes and Kirsch 
argued that economic and sociological theories have focused on explaining industry evolution over 
their lifespans.5 However, this research has not been set within a historical context and has generally 
excluded the period prior to industry emergence where important decisions are made about 
technologies and business models that impact on the evolution of the industry.6 
Kirsch et al. suggested that a historicist perspective (which recognises that industry knowledge is 
contextually embedded) could be helpful to researchers for understanding decisions, choices and 
agency in the development of industries.7 Many firms and industries have extensive historical 
archives which could be used for testing theoretical propositions across various stages of an industry 
lifecycle.8 These historical sources and methods could provide insights into issues not addressed by 
extant theory.9  
This research has drawn upon an extensive and well-preserved archive to investigate the emergence 
and growth of the electricity supply industry in Britain by examining the establishment and 
expansion of the Newcastle upon Tyne Electric Supply Company (NESCo). The NESCo was selected as 
a case study because it was a pioneer in a new industry and before the First World War had 
established the largest integrated power system in Europe.10 Further, it was the only financially 
successful British power company during this period.11 Previous research has examined the 
development of the electricity supply industry in Britain which has included a description of the 
growth of the NESCo.12 However, this earlier research was based on limited company documents 
because according to Hannah: ‘The archives of NESCo do not appear to have survived’.13 The 
researchers in this case have had access to company documents which has enabled them to 
document and examine the strategy pursued by the NESCo from its establishment in 1889 to 1914. 
In this paper, we draw upon the role of social capital in personal and business networks to examine 
their impact on the emergence and growth of the NESCo.14 A network is a potent asset that provides 
a firm with access to information, knowledge, capital, power and other networks.15 There is, 
however, less agreement on how networks impact on the development and growth of an 
enterprise.16 Some researchers have argued that strong ties contribute to firm growth during the 
emergence stage.17 Elfring and Hulsink qualified this assertion by arguing that new companies 
pursuing radical innovations benefit from strong ties during the opportunities discovery process, 
whilst weak ties are important for acquiring legitimacy.18 Social capital performs an important role in 
small firm networks, but little is known on how it contributes to company growth.19 Our aim is to 
address this research gap by examining the role of social capital in the emergence and growth of the 
NESCo. In particular, the research assesses the influence of social capital and its dimensions20  on 
two phases in the NESCo’s development: (i) the emergence period from 1889 to 1899 and (ii) the 
major investment boom in the electricity supply industry from 1900 up to the outbreak of war in 
1914.  
This study is organised into six sections. After the introduction the concepts of networks and social 
capital are discussed. In the third section, we outline how the case analysis was conducted. The 
fourth section briefly outlines the birth of Britain’s electrical supply industry. Two distinct phases in 
the development of the NESCo are examined: the emergence period from 1889-1899 and the 
growth period from 1900-1914. The latter section discusses how the company expanded through 
traction, economies of scale and acquisitions. The final section summarises the contribution of the 
research to advancing our understanding of emerging industries. 
 
2. Networks and Social Capital 
An entrepreneur’s personal and social networks are the most important resource at the start-up 
phase of a firm.21 Social capital comprises both the network and the assets accessed through the 
network.22 The social capital that an entrepreneur gains access to through his/her personal network 
builds legitimacy for the firm, provides access to other actors’ resources, information and 
knowledge, and the opportunity to identify and exploit opportunities.23 To Bourdieu, ‘social capital is 
the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition’.24 The three main, albeit interrelated, dimensions of social capital are structural, 
relational and cognitive.25 The structural dimension of social capital comprises an individual’s 
network of ties which includes the density, connectivity, centrality and hierarchical nature of the 
relationships. Individuals accumulate and acquire access to resources through their networks.26 The 
relational dimension includes respect, friendship, trust, obligations and expectations. The potential 
benefits for an actor stems from the nature of the relationships that they have with others in the 
network.27 Finally, the cognitive dimension of social capital refers to shared interpretations/language 
and systems of meaning among the various parties.28   
Hite and Hesterly argued that to attract resources and mitigate environmental uncertainty firm 
networks evolve from mainly identity-based links during emergence to calculative based connections 
during early growth.29 They defined identity based networks ‘as egocentric networks that have a 
high proportion of ties where some type of personal or social identification with the other actor 
motivates or influences economic action’.30 Strong, embedded ties are associated with trust and the 
exchange of fine-grained information between partners.31 Calculative networks are characterised by 
“a greater majority of weak ties that are more market-like than socially embedded….”32 Research 
findings are ambiguous on whether strong or weak ties are more beneficial to entrepreneurs.33   
Granovetter argued that novel information is more likely to flow through networks where actors are 
connected through weak ties as opposed to those where there are strong personal ties.34 Burt 
contended that bridging the structural holes in sparsely connected networks provided the 
entrepreneur with access to new ideas and opportunities.35 Social capital emanating from strong ties 
was deemed less valuable because the information provided was homogeneous and redundant.  
Granovetter subsequently reviewed his position and reasoned that in uncertain environments 
entrepreneurs were more likely to rely on strong as opposed to weak ties.36 Uncertainty impacts on 
how firms select network partners. Alvarez and Barney distinguished between entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making in a discovery context (characterized by risk) with that made in a creation context 
(characterized by uncertainty). In the former case, information is available to assess the risks of 
exploiting a business opportunity, whilst in the latter case information is sparse and decisions are 
likely to be based on heuristics, biases, or inductive, iterative, and incremental processes such as 
effectuation or bricolage.37 An entrepreneur is likely to use the yardstick of ‘acceptable losses’ as 
part of their judgement criteria in a creation context.38 Hmieleski et al. found that weak ties were 
more valuable in discovery (stable) as opposed to creation (dynamic) contexts.39 Companies may 
seek network benefits by developing an optimal mix of strong and weak ties.40  
3. Research Method 
Kirsch et al. argued that particular aspects of industry emergence and development are omitted 
from social science models of industry evolution.41 For example, the pre-history stage before 
product commercialization including decisions about technologies, applications and business models 
which could impact on industry evolution. How is industry knowledge ordered and re-ordered? The 
recording of firm behaviour is based on retrospective sensemaking as opposed to real-time 
observations. Theoretical myopia excludes alternative interpretations by shaping and re-ordering 
data to satisfy extant social scientific theory. Kirsch et al. stated that there is ‘real value to using 
historical evidence to test and elaborate existing theory’.42 The NESCo case provides an opportunity 
to examine the choices made by organisational actors and the factors that impacted on inception 
and growth. 
The researchers drew upon data from a wide range of sources including books on the electricity 
supply industry.43 Forbes and Kirsch argued that ‘historical archives represent a critical and under-
exploited resource for the study of emerging industries’.44 The NESCo archive contained board 
minutes, ledgers, company reports and accounts, and various company documents which enabled 
the researchers to document the development of the company. A privately published history of the 
Merz & McLellan Company included information on the family background and career of Charles 
Merz. The authors had access to Charles Merz’s notes written for his family which contained his 
personal perspective on his training, work experiences, the people he met, and the development of 
the electrical supply industry in the North-East of England. Charles Merz produced technical papers 
and articles on power generation which outlined his vision for the industry. The researchers used 
these various sources to triangulate and validate the data. 
The researchers followed the approach advocated by Langley for analysing process data. 45 First, we 
constructed a narrative on the establishment and growth of the NESCo from 1889 to 1914. Second, a 
temporal bracketing strategy was adopted to separate the data into two distinct time periods: (i) 
company emergence from 1889-1899; and (ii) the growth strategy from 1900-1914. According to 
Langley, temporal decomposition permits ‘the constitution of comparative units of analysis for the 
exploration and replication of theoretical ideas’.46 The first period focuses on the NESCo as a lighting 
company, whilst the second period examines its new strategy as a power company. These strategies 
were analysed in sequence in order to investigate the role of social capital in the company’s 
emergence and growth. 
 
4. The British electrical supply industry 
The birth of the electricity supply industry stemmed from Faraday’s discovery in 1831 of 
electromagnetic induction whereby electricity could be generated from mechanical power. During 
the following decades the dynamo or early forms of electric generators were developed. Arc lighting 
was installed in the Blackwall Lighthouse in 1857.47 The intensity of arc lighting made it suitable for 
this type of application, although an experiment at the South Foreland Lighthouse in 1858 found 
that it was three times more expensive than oil.48 The concept of carbon arc lighting was 
demonstrated by Sir Humphry Davy in 1808, but it was not commercially applied until the late-1870s 
when companies such as Brush, Cromptons and Siemens produced economical dynamo and arc-
lighting sets. 
Lighting in homes during this period came from candles, paraffin lamps, and in urban areas, gas light. 
Electric arc light beams were too intense for domestic use whilst gas provided poor quality 
illumination.49 This problem was resolved when Joseph Swan demonstrated his incandescent light 
bulb in Newcastle upon Tyne in 1878 and obtained a patent for his invention in 1880.50 Edison had 
also produced an incandescent lamp using similar scientific principles. Swan initially produced 25 
candle power (c.p.) lamps but he reduced them to a luminous intensity of 16 c.p. to match the 
incumbent and deeply embedded gas lighting. Incandescent lighting offered significant advantages 
over gas lighting because it was ‘cleaner, did not vitiate the atmosphere or blacken decorations’.51 
By the early 1880s many companies were established to exploit arc and incandescent lighting 
systems. 
The passage of the Electric Lighting Act of 1888 amended the 1882 Act by extending private 
enterprises’ tenure of central power stations from 21 to 42 years. This was expected to lead to a 
large increase in demand for power generation equipment.52 However, the two Acts still left the 
municipalities in a strong position, and some hindered applications from companies for local 
franchises in order to protect their municipal gas businesses.53 There was therefore limited electrical 
street lighting in Britain because of the strong competition from gas, and the electrical industry 
consequently operated on a small-scale in a small market.54 Technically, it was ‘little more than a 
collection of huts and basements with clanking reciprocating steam engines supplying lamps within a 
relatively small radius, providing challenges to the intellect of the engineer and an expensive, luxury 
illuminant for consumers, but with few spin-offs affecting the life and work of the nation in any 
significant way’.55 
5. The growth of the NESCo 
During the emergence phase electricity was produced in company installations or in small inefficient 
generating stations. Steam engines were widely used for producing power. In 1889 the NESCo was a 
local lighting company supplying an area of 10 square miles which, by 1900, had increased to just 16 
square miles.56 Thereafter, with its re-emergence as a power company, the NESCO expanded rapidly 
aided by Parliamentary legislation which granted power companies the right to supply electricity 
over larger areas. This enabled the NESCo and its associates to establish by 1911 a network of 
interconnected transmission lines to supply three-phase alternating current at 40 cycles to 1,400 
square miles in the North East of England.57 The difference between the northern and southern 
extremities of the transmission system was 70 miles.58  
 
5.1 Period 1: The emergence of the NESCo from 1889-1899 
Two rival companies were established in Newcastle in January 1889 to supply electricity for lighting: 
the Newcastle upon Tyne Electric Supply Company (NESCo) and the Newcastle and District Electric 
Light Company (DisCo). Parliament allocated to both companies the same areas of supply in 
Newcastle. Representatives from the two companies met to discuss possible arrangements. The 
NESCo had ruled out an amalgamation because of the presence of London directors on the DisCo 
board and of being bound to any particular system (alternating current versus direct current).59 An 
agreement was concluded whereby the NESCo would supply the eastern part of the city and the 
DisCo, one of whose directors was Charles Parsons,60 would concentrate on the western part. The 
benefit of this arrangement was that it ‘saves useless expenditure of capital which would be involved 
in the laying of two sets of mains in the same streets and the consequent additional interference 
with the public throughfares’.61    
Dr Theodore Merz and Dr Robert Spence Watson formed the NESCo as a lighting company following 
the passage of more favourable legislation in 1888.62 The social and cultural capital of the two men 
played an important role in the company’s formation. They were brother-in-laws and both were 
Quakers. Theodore Merz was an intellectual of German origins who wrote a four-volume History of 
European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. He was also a chemist and industrialist who had 
invested in Joseph Swan’s incandescent light company.63 Merz was married to the sister of John 
Wigham Richardson who was a leading shipbuilder on the River Tyne.64 Robert Spence Watson was a 
solicitor and an important public figure in the North of England. He was the Chairman of the National 
Liberal Federation and became a Privy Councillor in 1907.  
The NESCo was incorporated on 8 January 1889 with a small paid up capital. On 29 March 1,889 
shares were allotted to the amount of £8,850. To obtain a license from the Board of Trade to 
maintain electricity works in Newcastle required the support of the Corporation. It could be argued 
that the NESCo’s formation was very opportune as local authorities were not actively engaged in 
electricity supply because its success had not been demonstrated.65 The NESCo operated under a 
license for three years until it obtained Provisional Orders through an Act of Parliament. In return for 
the Corporation withdrawing its opposition to the granting of Provisional Orders, the NESCo agreed 
to supply and distribute electricity in Newcastle for thirty-one years as opposed to the forty-two 
years fixed by the Act of 1888.66 As the production of electricity became successfully established, the 
local authorities entered the industry in the 1890s. In some cases buying out on favourable terms 
the operations of the private companies. The Newcastle Corporation considered purchasing the 
NESCo in 1895 but was dissuaded from doing so because the company charges were low, there was 
a competing company that would also have to be purchased, and the savings would not be large.67  
The board of directors comprised men from some of the most important industrial concerns in the 
North East of England who provided the critical mass of structural and financial capital to establish 
the company. These directors included: the chairman Alderman Thomas Gibson (Mayor of 
Newcastle in 1882); Dr John Theodore Merz; Dr Robert Spence Watson; Sir Lindsay Wood (Managing 
Director of Hetton Collieries and Chairman of the Durham Coalowners’ Association); John H 
Armstrong (Armstrong family and later Chairman of the NESCo); and Sir James Knott (shipping 
magnate who established the Prince Line Company in 1895, and a coal owner). These directors’ 
social and cultural capital provided the legitimacy to establish the NESCo in the market. Additionally, 
the directors provided cognitive capital in the form of managerial expertise and knowledge of their 
industry domain, and structural capital by affording access for the provision of electricity. 
A power station containing two 100-cycle 75 kilowatt Mordey alternators, each driven by a Robey 
slow-speed steam engine was built at Pandon Dene close to the Blythe and Tyne branch of the North 
Eastern Railway. Additional alternators were later installed of which the largest was 500 kilowatts. 
The directors were convinced that there was a large demand for electricity for lighting. However, 
with little pre-existing information available and operating in a creation context with uncertain 
market conditions, the directors adopted a flexible strategy. A capital outlay of £8,000 was invested 
to supply electricity for lighting for 4,800 ten (reduced to eight) candle power lamps of which 3,000 
could be alight at any one time. Electricity was supplied to consumers at a price range from 3.6d 
(pence) to 4.5d per kWh which with discounts averaged out at 4d per kWh.68  
The NESCo was able to grow through the financial support provided by the Chairman, Thomas 
Gibson, and the legal advice of Robert Spence Watson.69 Table 1 shows that from 1891 to 1899, sales 
grew from £4,000 to £17,000 whilst net profits increased from £1,000 to £6,000. Finance was 
provided from local sources in the North East of England. Equity grew from £20,000 in 1891 to 
£64,000 in 1898 and then £115,000 in 1899 whilst debentures of circa £15,000 to £25,000 were held 
until their repayment in 1899. The NESCo profited from the Newcastle Corporation’s lack of interest 
in becoming a supplier of electricity, and the north bank of the Tyne comprised small municipal 
districts.70 There was available locally an abundance of cheap bituminous coal. Further, Tyneside had 
a dense industrial base and many regional companies had been progressive in adopting electricity. 
The shipbuilding industry was booming.71 Shipbuilders were early adopters of electricity and many 
Tyneside shipyards had installed electric power by the 1890s.  
Insert Table 1 The NESCO extracts from Financial Statements, 1891-1914 (£000) 
In 1898 the Newcastle Corporation filed a Bill in Parliament to erect a generating station to supply 
electricity to the tramways. The NESCo and the DisCo opposed the Corporation’s Bill on the grounds 
that their Provisional Orders gave them the sole right to supply electricity within the Parliamentary 
boundary.72 However, their case was rejected and the opportunity to expand into traction was lost. 
The development of the electric motor now enabled electricity previously restricted to providing 
lighting to be used for power.73 Unfortunately, the lighting companies’ ability to supply this market 
was constrained by the small-size of the generating stations, the smallness of the area that they 
supplied under the Provisional Orders, and the liability to be purchased by the municipality. These 
constraints were removed following the recommendations of the Cross Committee (1898) and the 
Kitson Committee (1900). The companies, nevertheless, complained that these disabilities were 
removed only to be replaced by new constraints. Power companies received authorisation to 
provide a bulk supply in areas where there were no authorised distributors, but they were excluded 
from supplying in areas where there was an authorised distributor unless they received the latter’s 
consent. This consent could not be unreasonably withheld if the company could supply at a cheaper 
rate to consumers. Large towns were excluded from the power companies’ areas because of the 
opposition of the municipalities.74 This policy change shaped the strategic thinking of the NESCo 
directors. 
At the end of 1899, the NESCo had ‘an antiquated system of supply, difficult to extend and one from 
which it was impossible to supply motive power’. 75 Its system was out-of-date and the Pandon Dene 
station was too small and supplied lighting to a small area of Newcastle.76 Between 1889 and 1900 
the NESCo had increased the area that it supplied with electricity from 10 to 16 square miles.77 A 
sum of £130,000 had been invested in the old system but it was plagued by constant faults and 
interruptions to supply.78 In response, the management invested £100,000 in laying a new direct 
current system and extending the Pandon Dene Power Station.79 There was a growing demand for 
electricity for lighting especially in the metropolitan areas and electricity was replacing steam power 
in some large factories. The application of electricity for traction was similarly increasing. Electrical 
generating plant had improved considerably as well as the methods for transmission of current. 
Competition from the DisCo was more intense. The NESCo’s strategic choice to meet the potential 
increase in demand was to develop a larger scheme, or to ‘merge our small undertaking into the 
larger organisation which was being planned to embrace the whole district’.80 In the winter of 1899, 
the directors made the strategic decision to transform the NESCo into a power company.81 The 
problem was that none of the directors had the knowledge of how to develop a district wide 
scheme.82  
5.2 Period 2: The Growth of NESCo 1900-1914 
In response to the Corporation’s Bill, and the more favourable environment for power companies, 
the NESCo and the DisCo strategies focused on developing schemes to supply electricity for general 
power purposes. Charles Parsons and Alan Campbell Swinton83 filed a Bill to Parliament under the 
name of the Tyneside Electric Power Company to supply the whole of Tyneside.  If the Parsons’ Bill 
was successful, the NESCo would in the interests of its shareholders have had to consider merging 
into the larger organisation.84 This is where the family and Quaker connections were to play a crucial 
role.  
John Wigham Richardson was a shipbuilder who had established the Neptune Works on the River 
Tyne. He was also a director of the Walker and Wallsend Gas Company which had pioneered the use 
of gas for industrial purposes along the north bank of the River Tyne. Wigham Richardson had 
experience of the application of electrical power in shipbuilding and in 1898 he encouraged the Gas 
Company to enter into the electricity supply business. This would provide the company with 
insurance to focus on whichever energy source became predominant.  
Charles Merz, Theodore’s son, was engaged in a consultancy capacity to present the technical 
evidence to the Parliamentary Committee. He was 24 years old. Charles Merz read engineering at 
Armstrong College but never graduated. Instead he took an apprenticeship with the NESCo and in 
1892 began work at the Pandon Dene generating station where he gained experience of electrical 
generation, installation, and repairing boilers and faults in generators and cables.85 He spent part of 
his apprenticeship at Robey’s to increase his mechanical knowledge of boilers. Merz then joined 
Thomson-Houston (BTH), an American subsidiary where his father was a director, to supervise the 
installation of steam engines and alternators at the Bankside Power Station on the Thames in 
London. From 1896 to 1898 he worked on the construction of a new power station at Croydon 
where he was responsible for the installation of generating equipment and the workings of 
substations and street-lighting systems. On its completion, Merz was appointed manager and 
engineer and was accountable for operating the plant and electricity sales. After a brief period at 
BTH headquarters arranging subcontracts for equipment, he was sent to Cork in 1898 to install a 
tramway system. Charles Merz had accumulated considerable human capital through experience 
and practical learning from his various work placements. He had developed a keen interest in the 
application of electricity for power purposes.86  
Family connections provided Charles Merz with his first major break as John Wigham Richardson was 
his maternal uncle. Parliament passed the Bill in 1899 on condition that the Neptune Bank site which 
had been purchased for the provision of gas was used. Charles Merz turned down the position of 
chief electrical engineer to the Gas Company, but agreed to supervise the construction and 
development of the Neptune Bank Power Station as an independent consulting engineer. He 
recruited William McLellan as his assistant.  They had worked together on developing a tramways 
and lighting system in Ireland for the Cork Electric Tramways and Lighting Company.87 McLellan was 
an engineering graduate from Liverpool University. He had previously worked at Cochran, the boiler 
manufacturer, and Siemens. The two men formed a formidable team: ‘Merz was a man of 
imagination and drive and financial acumen…. Whilst McLellan…..was the severely practical man, 
with a wide knowledge of all the electrical apparatus, from dynamos and motors to switchgear and 
cables’.88  
The Gas Company had similar ambitions to the NESCo to supply electricity to Tyneside. Theodore 
Merz, John Wigham Richardson together with Charles Merz and William McLellan devised a rival 
scheme to that being proposed by Charles Parsons and Alan Campbell Swinton. This involved 
connecting the NESCo system to the Gas Company’s Neptune Bank Power Station to supply the 
north bank of the Tyne.89 The close family ties helped to cement the agreement between the two 
companies. Robert Spence Watson’s law firm took on the legal work associated with promoting the 
Private Bill. 
In 1900 a Parliamentary Committee chaired by Sir James Kitson considered the two rival Bills. The 
NESCo case relied on the legal advice of Robert Spence Watson, the expert witness of Charles Merz, 
and the legal counsel who had previously defended the Newcastle Corporation’s position. Sir James 
Kitson was both a Liberal Member of Parliament and a Unitarian. He was also a member of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers and the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and had a very good 
understanding of industrial supply issues compared to the average politician.90 Kitson was also a 
director of the North-Eastern Railway Company.91 Charles Merz believed that the case put forward in 
support of the Tyneside Bill was ill-prepared which led to it being rejected.92 The NESCo-Walker 
scheme received Royal Assent paving the way for the NESCo to supply electricity to districts on the 
north and south banks of the River Tyne.  
The Pandon Dene Power Station was too small to meet the increasing demand for electricity for 
lighting and the new growing demand for power purposes. Additional generating plant was required 
which led to the NESCo purchasing from the Gas Company the incomplete Neptune Bank Power 
Station.  Under the agreement the NESCo agreed to sell bulk electricity to the Gas Company for 
supply to its customers. The acquisition of the Gas Company’s electrical undertaking was more for 
strategic than revenue purposes ‘……it is no doubt been the correct policy for the Company to obtain 
entire control of it and thus avoid any risk of the progress of electricity being prejudiced due to the 
Gas Company having both a Gas and Electricity Department’.93  
Charles Merz was appointed the Consulting Engineer to the NESCo.94 In 1901 McLellan’s name was 
incorporated into the name of the new firm now known as Merz & McLellan. That year Merz & 
McLellan was tasked with linking the NESCo transmission system with those already connected to 
the Neptune Bank Power Station.95 It was the first power station to be designed by the two men and 
incorporated their views on the ‘primacy of industrial load, economy of scale, and turbine 
efficiency’.96 The station had the lowest generating costs in Britain.97 It was the world’s first power 
station to provide electricity for power as opposed to lighting and the first in Britain to use a three-
phase system.98 Charles Merz used his network to seek advice on three-phase electric power from 
engineers at the General Electric Company in the US and Swiss engineers working for Brown 
Boveri.99 The advantage of three-phase supply was that higher voltages could be used by industrial 
motors and lower voltages could be supplied to domestic users.100 A periodicity of forty cycles per 
second (40Hz) became the standard frequency for the North East Coast area as it was suitable for 
lighting as well as rotary converters used in traction.101  
By the beginning of 1901 Neptune Bank was supplying three-phase alternating current to several 
shipyards and engineering companies including Armstrong Whitworth and Swan Hunter.102 Sir 
George Burton Hunter, the Chairman of Swan Hunter, had joined the NESCo board in 1900 along 
with Sir John Henry Brunel Noble whose directorships included the London and North Eastern 
Railway Company, the Easington Coal Company, and the North Eastern Board of Martins Bank. His 
father, Sir Andrew Noble, was the Chairman of Armstrong Whitworth. The power station was 
publicly opened in June 1901 by Lord Kelvin. Sir Andrew Noble presided at the opening.103 The 
ceremonial opening of the power station by a renowned physicist and a prominent industrialist 
demonstrated the regional stature of the NESCo.   
The boundaries of the electricity supply industry had been redefined to include power as well as 
lighting. The generating plant comprised four 700 kilowatt alternators driven by slow-speed marine 
reciprocating engines supplied by the family connected firm of Wigham Richardson & Company and 
the Wallsend Slipway & Engineering Company.104 Merz and McLellan adopted the marine engines, 
first, because of their reliability and, second, the chief consumers were expected to be marine 
engineers.105 Further, the Merz & McLellan team possessed the relevant cognitive capital to 
persuade the engineers and Tyne shipbuilders of the cost advantages of replacing their small steam 
and gas engines by more adaptable electric power.106 In 1902, two Parsons 1,500 kilowatt steam 
turbine driven turbo-alternators, then the largest in the world, were installed to increase power 
production.107 Neptune Bank was the only British power station that had installed both reciprocating 
engines and turbines to generate electricity.108  
The strong structural interrelationship between the NESCo and the firm of Merz & McLellan was 
demonstrated by the consulting engineers being listed on the former’s organisational structure.109 
Merz and McLellan attended the NESCo ‘meeting of officers’ which discussed project planning and 
network operations.110 Merz produced ‘plant capacity reports’ to assist the NESCo with its strategic 
planning.111 He developed the technological and economic strategy that transformed the NESCo 
from an urban lighting utility into a regional power company.112 The two companies had 
complementary capabilities: Merz & McLellan designed the power stations and possessed the 
cognitive capital to build trusting relationships with organisations located on the North East coast of 
England to persuade them to take power from the NESCo. Merz & McLellan would then provide the 
consultancy service to design and install the equipment required by these new customers.  Other 
electrical utilities also used consulting engineers, but the closeness of the relationship between the 
NESCo and Merz & McLellan was unique amongst British electrical utilities which shaped the style of 
the regional system that developed.113 
5.2.1 Traction 
In 1902 the NESCo sought Parliamentary approval to provide power on the north bank of the Tyne to 
the Tyneside Tramways and Tramroads Company. Family and cross-directorate connections played 
an important role in this expansion as John Wigham Richardson was an investor in the company. The 
NESCo expected to make 9.4% return on capital from this investment which was below the target 
return of 15%.114 This investment was approved on the basis of attracting more customers as the 
mains were laid. A new agreement was signed in July 1904 which committed the Tramways 
Company to take energy from the NESCo for the next 15 years.115 The NESCo took a £13,000 
shareholding in the company and Theodore Merz (who later became Chairman) and Sir John Noble 
were appointed to the board.116  
Merz and McLellan argued that electrification enabled tramways to compete with railways because 
the increase in new passengers was ‘frequently ten times as great as formerly’.117 There was 
opposition from the North-Eastern Railway (NER) which feared the impact on its business. During 
the Parliamentary inquiry, Charles Merz suggested to George Gibb, the NER’s General Manager, that 
the company should consider electrifying the railway line.118 Merz had the appropriate cognitive 
capital to understand the NER’s strategic and operational requirements from observing inter-urban 
railway systems in the United States. He had also acquired, whilst planning the Neptune Bank Power 
Station, knowledge of the Swiss mountain railway system which operated with three-phase 
alternating current. Shortly afterwards, Merz & McLellan was commissioned by the NER to draw up a 
scheme to create the first electric suburban rail network in Britain operating some 82 miles of single 
track.119 Merz’s ability to draw on this structural mix of strong social and weak technical ties enabled 
him to apply knowledge in a new context and provide a technical solution which turned an objector 
into a customer and supporter.120  Gibbs and Merz became close friends which produced a trusting 
relationship between their companies resulting in the accumulation of relational capital.121 From a 
structural capital perspective, Merz & McLellan provided the NESCo with access to a new market.  
The few railways that had used electricity for traction had built their own power station to generate 
electricity. Merz viewed this as uneconomic and preferred to spread the load factor between 
industrial, domestic and traction in order to reduce prices.122 He proposed to supply a portion of the 
electricity from the Neptune Bank Power Station which was nearly fully loaded with the bulk of the 
supply coming from the planned larger station at Carville.123 The NER would pay the NESCo 1.0d for 
the first 3 million kilowatt hours (kWh) in any one year, 0.75d for the next 3 million kWh and 0.55d 
for all units over 6 million in any one year. A further guarantee was that the quantity of electrical 
energy taken or paid for would not be less than 5 million kWh in any year.124 The contract allowed 
the NESCo to use the new mains and substations to supply electricity to other consumers, which 
would reduce unit costs.125 The first part of the electrification scheme came into operation on 29 
March 1904 and was the first example in Britain of a steam railway converting to electric traction.  
 
5.2.2 Economies of Scale 
Before 1914 typically 40% of electricity was produced in generating stations and 60% on premises by 
the users.126 The average generating capacity of a power station was 5,000 horse power, ‘or about 
one-fourth of the capacity of one single generating machine of economical size and about one-
thirtieth of the size of what may be considered as an economical power station unit’.127 Most of 
these power stations were ‘principally enlarged versions of the lighting stations built at the turn of 
the century’.128 In general, the industry with the exception of the NESCo found it difficult to achieve 
economies of scale.129 
Table 2 shows that the NESCo’s electricity output increased from under 1 million kWh in 1899 to just 
over 9 million kWh in 1903 which was ‘a comparatively small output for a power scheme’.130 The 
environment in which the NESCo was operating conformed to that of a creation context with 
considerable uncertainty about how to develop new business opportunities.131 Large power stations 
had been created in other areas of Britain to deliver bulk supply whereas the NESCo had invested in 
‘detailed distribution’.132 Merz contended that economic electricity production demanded large 
central power stations supplying large areas with lighting, traction and power.133 A mass production 
strategy aimed at high load factor users such as traction, collieries and chemical works was 
implemented which was based on similar strategies adopted by American and German 
companies.134 This was a way of spreading risk against fluctuations in demand in any one sector.135  
Merz and McLellan recognised that a power supply company’s commercial success depended upon 
‘the cheapness and reliability of supply’,136 which took precedence over ‘economy of production’. 
This principle was embodied in the ground-breaking Carville generating station which opened in 
1904.137 
Insert Table 2 Electricity Sales of the NESCo from 1891-1913 (millions kWh) 
Merz and McLellan focused on controlling capital costs rather than running costs by emphasising 
simplicity of design together with a provision for future extensions. Their unit system of construction 
comprised several independent units, each consisting of a boiler, generating set and switch-gear.138 
This made it easy to isolate and repair faulty units. The Carville Station was a cladded steel frame 
building as opposed to brick and was ‘the first large generating station of the modern type’ in the 
world.139 Carville was the lowest cost power station in Britain with a capital cost of £16 per kW 
compared to £20-£26 per kW for other contemporary stations.140  The station running costs were as 
low as or lower than other power stations.141 It was the largest public power station in Europe and 
was powered by Parsons’ steam turbines – two 1,500 kilowatt units and two 3,500 kilowatts units; 
the latter were twice the size of any turbine that had been constructed.142 Carville accounted for 
64% of the system’s capacity from 1906-10 and was the foundation of the NESCo’s rapid growth 
during this period.143 Carville was also the first British power station to have a Control Room to 
manage the entire system on the control diagram and to make decisions on the loads carried by the 
various stations.144 Merz had taken this idea from practice in American power stations and it became 
a standard feature for all large electrical systems.145  In 1910 the NESCo opened the Dunston Power 
Station which contained turbo-alternators produced by Brown Boveri of Switzerland and AEG of 
Germany providing a total generating capacity of 33,850 kilowatts. The capital cost was £11 per kW 
which was well below the national average.146 
The growth in electricity demand produced an increase in generation factors from 8-12% in the 
1890s (mainly lighting) to over 20% from 1908 to 1914.147 As the NESCo used its capital equipment 
more intensely, its load factor after 1907 averaged 40-50%.148 This allowed the NESCo to significantly 
reduce its production costs and electricity prices. The average price per unit was predicted to 
decrease because manufacturers expected ‘an excessively low price for power, and……they 
expect(ed) to get their lighting thrown in at the same price’.149 It was difficult to charge separately 
for power and lighting as many manufacturers used the same circuits for both. In 1900 the NESCo’s 
average price charged to manufacturers was 3d per kWh and for lighting 4.09d.150 By 1905 the 
average price for electricity had fallen to 1.16d per kWh,151 and by 1913 it was less than ½d per 
kWh.152 Charles Merz was able to claim that there was not ‘a single firm of shipbuilders or engineers 
on the north bank of the Tyne inside the power company’s area of supply which does not take 95 
per cent of its power from the company, the remaining 5 per cent being produced from small gas 
engines or from boilers fired with scrap wood’.153  
The success of the mass production strategy is shown by the large expansion in sales after 1905 to 
the collieries, chemical and process industries, as well as the traditional manufacturing sectors (see 
Table 2). Bulk sales also grew as some local authorities such as Middlesbrough, Tynemouth and 
Stockton opted to buy electricity in bulk from the NESCo rather than extend their own generating 
capacity. This strategy produced an increase in net profit to £132,000 by 1914 and the growth in 
equity to over £1 million (see Table 1). Up to 1905, finance had been raised locally, but the growth 
strategy required raising finance nationally. Charles Merz had developed a relationship with the 
merchant bankers, Leonard and Walter Cunliffe. George Gibb had introduced Merz to Walter 
Cunliffe (later Lord) who had been appointed a director of the NER in 1905.154 This led to an 
introduction to Sir Robert Kindersley who was a partner in the merchant bank Lazard Brothers. 
Debentures were issued through Lazard Brothers in 1906 followed by a large issue of 4½% 
debentures for £688,000 in 1909.155 Leonard Cunliffe joined the NESCo board in 1908 followed by 
Robert Henry Brand (later Lord Brand) of Lazard brothers in 1913.156 The NESCo had the financial 
network to raise capital for further expansion. 
 
5.2.3 Acquisitions 
In the neighbouring areas across the Tyne in Gateshead and Durham, electrification had been 
developed on a small-scale compared with the north side of the river.157 Small power stations were 
established at Jarrow, Gateshead and Durham supplying direct current for lighting and traction.   
Electricity generation and supply resided with two companies controlled by the British Electric 
Traction Company (BET): the County of Durham Electric Power Distribution Company (CDEPDC); and 
the County of Durham Electric Supply Company (CDEPSC).  
Charles Merz used his connection with William Madgen who was a director of the CDEPDC to 
persuade the Durham Company to take a bulk supply from the NESCo.158 High tension cables were 
laid over the High Level Bridge to connect the Manors substation and the Gateshead Power Station 
which linked the two distribution systems.159 Under the agreement, the Durham Company adopted 
the same ‘voltage and periodicity’ standards as the NESCo.160 When the BET faced financial 
difficulties in 1904, the NESCo acquired the two Durham Power companies for £256,000 to control 
electricity supply on the north and south banks of the Tyne.161 Although the CDEPDC and the NESCo 
operated as separate companies, the majority of the directors on the Durham Company board were 
from the NESCo.162 The Gateshead and Jarrow power stations were connected to Carville and were 
in effect distribution centres to enable the NESCo to supply electricity to other large towns and 
collieries in County Durham. Overhead lines were not feasible so a 22,000 volts underground cable 
system, which was the highest voltage in Britain, was laid to minimise power losses over long 
distances.163 As no British cable maker would to take on this job, Merz and McLellan used their 
international links to contract it to Algemeine Electricitat Geselschaft of Berlin.164  
The Cleveland and Durham County Electric Power Company was established in 1903 to supply 
electricity to the Durham coalfield, Darlington, Stockton, Middlesbrough and parts of Teesside, but 
faced financial difficulties from its inception. Merz and McLellan provided support to the Cleveland 
Company as the NESCo was fully occupied with its recent acquisition of the Durham companies to 
engage in another take-over.165 In 1906 Merz and McLellan conceived the idea of floating a new 
company to acquire the Cleveland Company plus the failing Northern Counties Electric Supply 
Company which supplied electricity to some small towns in Northumberland, Durham and North 
Yorkshire.166 The latter had produced a power scheme for Northumberland, but Parliamentary 
approval was given in 1902 to the rival scheme produced by the NESCo. Under the new proposal, the 
Cleveland and Durham County Electric Power Company retained its name and continued to operate 
as a separate entity, although the new board contained directors who were close associates of 
Charles Merz.167 Merz arranged for the Cleveland Company to be physically connected to the NESCo 
by a 20,000 volt cable laid under the Tyne at Hebburn.168 The Cleveland Company was not a financial 
success and its share capital was acquired by the NESCo in 1917.169  
The NESCo, Durham and Cleveland companies were registered as separate entities, though all three 
companies were controlled by one staff based in Newcastle. It was an ‘unwieldy arrangement’, but 
amalgamating all three companies would have required Parliamentary approval which may have 
‘stir(red) up a lot of opposition’.170  In 1907, the NESCo acquired the Durham Collieries Electric Power 
Company which was supplying power to the local collieries and the Sunderland District Electric 
Tramways. Many of these companies operated at different cycles and pursuing uniformity delayed 
the development of the system. However, the economies of integration and large-scale operation 
justified the conversion to a common system.171 In 1909 the NESCo, Cleveland and Durham systems 
which were supplying areas in close proximity were connected together to create the first grid 
system in Britain running from north of the Tyne to south of the Tees.172 It was the largest integrated 
network in Europe.173 Charles Merz has been described as the ‘British Edison’174 for his work on 
developing an economic and integrated electricity supply system in North East England. 
Charles Merz recognised that potentially useful energy was being wasted in factories, collieries and 
steel manufacturing. In 1902 the Owners of the Priestman Collieries (OPC) planned to establish a 
modern coke-making plant near Blaydon Burn with eighty ovens that produced coal gas as a by-
product which could be used to generate electricity. This provided the NESCo with an opportunity to 
expand into the Blaydon district at the expense of its then competitor the CDEPDC. Merz & McLellan 
acted as a broker between the NESCo and the OPC and the commissioned report produced by the 
partners recommended constructing a power station at Blaydon to utilise the waste heat and gas.  
The NESCo and the OPC established the Priestman Power Company to administer the facility. Two 
Babcock and Wilcox boilers supplied steam to two 275 kilowatt Parsons three-phase alternators 
which began operating in 1904 supplying electricity to the Blaydon Burn Colliery. In early 1905 the 
Blaydon Power Station was connected by underground cable to the NESCo network enabling it to 
supply electricity to the CDEPDC network. The NESCo acquired the Priestman Power Company in 
1914.  
Additional companies were formed to utilise the waste heat and gases from industrial processes. 
The Durham Collieries Electric Power Company was formed in 1905 to supply electricity to collieries 
in north Durham. When the company faced financial difficulties in 1907 its debts were underwritten 
by the NESCo which took control of the power station, and from 1909 operated its distribution 
system.175 In 1907 the Waste Heat and Electrical Generating Stations Company was formed to 
establish power stations in South Durham and Teesside to utilise the waste heat and gas from local 
blast furnaces, coke ovens and industrial sites to feed into the NESCo network. By the end of the 
First World War, the NESCo had 11 waste heat stations in operation.176 The interconnecting of the 
generation stations allowed Carville which had a capacity of 25,000 kilowatts following its extension 
in 1907 to supply the base load, the smaller stations were used for peak use, and the waste heat 
stations provided electricity at a very low marginal cost.177  
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
The main contribution of this research is to examine historically how social capital contributed to the 
emergence and growth of the NESCo. In particular, the research examined the role of the different 
dimensions of social capital in the emergence and growth stages.  The data were separated into two 
distinct time periods to examine the transformation of the NESCo from a lighting company confined 
to the eastern part of Newcastle into a regional power company. Social capital had an important 
impact on operational performance as well as financial measures. This is indicated by the large 
growth in output from the mid-1900s and with it a large reduction in the costs of production. 
The social and cultural capital of Theodore Merz and Robert Spence Watson were critical for 
establishing the company and for raising finance locally through personal and business networks. 
Their spur was the more favourable legislative changes introduced by the Electric Lighting Act of 
1888. Merz and Spence Watson were able to use their respective social standing in the North East of 
England to attract to the NESCo board leading industrialists who provided the structural capital to 
establish the company and cognitive capital in the form of managerial expertise.  Strong ties were 
important in both phases of the NESCo’s development as the industry environment was 
characterised by uncertainty (creation) as opposed to risk (discovery). Of the fifteen power 
companies that were formed up to 1912 only the NESCo was financially successful.178 The 
institutional arrangements that governed the area of supply and the regional nature of the NESCo 
were also factors in the importance of maintaining strong ties.  
Among the major factors that assisted the transformation of the NESCo from a lighting company into 
a power company were the favourable economic and geographical features of the North of England. 
The NESCo supplied a region that had 5.1% of the population, mined 19.6% of the coal, made 36.5% 
of the coke, mined 37.5% of the iron ore, produced 37.7% of the pig iron, and built 51% of the 
merchant ships in Britain.179 Charles and Theodore Merz were able to capitalise on these advantages 
to build a strong regional network comprising relatives, Quakers and professional associates.180 Their 
close connections with the leading industrialists in the region from shipbuilding, engineering, mining 
and traction were a conduit for providing electricity to these industries. The power and influence of 
this industrial, financial, political and social network helped the NESCo to cross ‘parochial political 
boundaries’ to expand its operations. 
Hughes argued that whilst geographical, economic and organizational factors were propitious, the 
principal reasons for the evolution of the NESCo into a regional power company were political and 
social.181 Many local authorities in rapidly expanding industrial towns and cities in northern England 
(without ports, racecourses, or piers) viewed profits from municipal enterprises as a means of 
financing health programmes without putting all of the burden on the ratepayers.182 From 1898 to 
1902, some 62 municipal authorities began supplying electricity, and by the end of 1903, two-thirds of 
the connections to the public supply mains (measured in kW) were accounted for by the 
municipalities.183 The NESCo, however, enjoyed a ‘comparative freedom from municipal opposition’.184 
Further, the company was awarded powers to extend its area of supply by defeating its opponents 
before Parliamentary Committees.   
There are several reasons for the unique position enjoyed by the NESCo. The Tyneside economy was 
dominated by heavy industry, but Newcastle was a service and commercial centre for the industrial 
region. Newcastle had by the early 1880s become the second most important British port in terms of 
export tonnage and the sixth most important in terms of export value.185 The estate income from the 
port partly explains why the Newcastle Corporation did not establish municipal gas, water and electric 
enterprises. A further reason was that Newcastle had a highly dynamic economy that was dominated 
by an integrated entrepreneurial elite that not only ‘exercised immense economic power, but also 
controlled many of the wider social and political institutions’.186 They sat on the boards of each other’s 
companies. They were also major investors in the utilities which provided services to their companies. 
Hughes concluded that ‘(t)he leaders of this industrial community used their political and financial 
power to support the privately owned NESCo while most other urban centers, excluding London, 
promoted government-owned electric supply’.187 The Corporation therefore left the established 
utilities in private control, but opted to launch a municipal tramway system that began operating at 
the end of 1901. A municipal power station was completed in 1904 to supply power to the tramway 
system. 
Organisational growth after 1900 also stemmed from the close structural relationship that was 
established between the NESCo and the consulting engineering firm of Merz & McLellan. The two 
companies had complementary capabilities: the former supplied the electricity whilst the latter had 
the capability to design innovative power stations and to manage complex projects. The level of 
social capital is increased when the structural effects are enhanced by a strong relational element.188 
The relationship was underpinned by a shared cognitive capital based on family values, mutual 
respect and trust. Charles Merz and William McLellan possessed valuable cognitive capital and 
provided technical and business advice which contributed to the NESCo’s expansion strategy and 
entry into new markets such as traction and the utilisation of waste heat. The relational social capital 
based on close family ties encouraged the two companies to work closely together on developing 
their mutual business interests. It reduced the likelihood of either party engaging in opportunistic 
behaviour to pursue their individual interests which strengthened their social capital.189 The strong 
relational capital was reflected by the interchange of staff between the two companies.190  
As the NESCo expanded it increased its network diversity and complexity through acquisitions and 
joint ventures with Merz & McLellan acting as an intermediary to both strong and weak network 
ties. This resulted in a differentiated as opposed to a homogenous composition of social capital 
which provided the NESCo with access to novel information, resources, and new market 
opportunities.191 Charles Merz and the firm of Merz & McLellan provided the bridging192 social 
capital to the weak network ties that furnished the NESCo with crucial knowledge on three-phase 
electricity, high voltage cable, and suburban railway electrification. Charles Merz’s ability to develop 
his social networks and build strong relationships with actors from different industries and networks 
transformed his private social capital into a public good for the benefit of both the NESCo and Merz 
& McLellan.193 The relationship with Merz & McLellan prevented any relational lock-in to existing 
network ties.194  
Analysing the emergence and growth of the NESCo in a historical context has shown that industry 
emergence is a complex phenomenon that involves organisations, institutions, political factors, the 
economic and geographical context, as well as the role of individual actors.  By drawing upon 
historical documents, this research has been able to explore the emergence of the company and, 
how under conditions of uncertainty, the NESCo was able to transform itself from a lighting company 
into a successful power company. 
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Table 1 The NESCO extracts from Financial Statements, 1891-1914 (£000) 
Year Total Revenue  Net Profit Total Equity Preference Shares Debentures 
1891 4 1 20 - 15 
1892 6 2 27 - 15 
1893 7 1 31 - 17 
1894 8 2 35 - 20 
1895 9 2 41 - 20 
1896 10 3 48 - 20 
1897 13 5 51 - 25 
1898 15 5 64 - 25 
1899 17 6 115 - - 
1900 20 9 140 52 - 
1901 23 11 204 125 - 
1902 45 18 241 170 140 
1903 76 28 409 245 250 
1904 109 41 550 357 250 
1905 140 50 604 375 250 
1906 177 52 517 400 381 
1907 241 57 559 438 438 
1908 N/A 44 808 688 439 
1909 N/A 65 841 688 688 
1910 N/A 64 845 688 688 
1911 N/A 70 870 688 688 
1912 N/A 76 861 688 688 
1913 N/A 105 937 688 1,088 
1914 N/A 132 1,022 912 1,088 
Total Revenue = Sales of electricity +apparatus rental income; Net Profit is calculated after tax but before 
interest; Total Equity is ordinary share capital plus reserves 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Table 2 Electricity Sales of the NESCo from 1891-1913 (millions kWh) 
  Year Lighting  & 
  Heating 
Traction Manufacturers Collieries Chemical 
& 
Process 
  Bulk 
  Supply 
Total 
1891 0.24      0.24 
1892 0.34      0.34 
1893 0.36      0.36 
1894 0.40      0.40 
1895 0.45      0.45 
1896 0.54      0.54 
1897 0.66      0.66 
1898 0.80      0.80 
1899 0.97      0.97 
1900 1.01      1.01 
1901 1.47  1.03    2.50 
1902 1.88 0.19 2.96    5.54 
1903 2.59 0.70 4.74   1.00 9.03 
1904 2.90 6.00 6.29   2.00 17.19 
1905 2.71 12.31 8.74 0.42  6.20 30.38 
1907 4.90 13.30 38.30 7.80 30.60 4.80 99.70 
1909 4.90 14.20 40.10 34.30 36.10 4.70 134.30 
1911 5.90 15.50 49.90 44.90 42.00 7.60 165.80 
1913 7.90 15.30 75.90 76.80 35.90 20.60 232.40 
 
Sources: 1891-1900, NESCo, 1904, p.50; 1901-1905, NESCo, 1903 plus authors’ estimates from company data. 
Small motors have been classified under manufacturing. The total sales for 1902 is a revised figure and is 
greater than the sum of the individual categories. 1907-1913, Byatt, 1962, p.151 
*1905 The NESCo provided a bulk supply of nearly 6.2 million kWh to the CDEPDC and 14,170 kWh to the 
Tynemouth Corporation. The CDEPDC supplied the electricity to manufacturers, collieries, the tramways and to 
customers for Lighting & Heating. This needs to be taken into account when interpreting the data from 1909 to 
1913. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
